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I. THE CHANGING LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. Eschewing Dichotomies
Not very long ago the regulation of warfare by international law was
conveniently organized according to several sets of dichotomies: the right to
use force was determined by the presence or absence of an actual armed
attack; the type of the military conflict was either international or internal,
each with its unique set of norms; the regulation of the hostilities was founded
on the dichotomy between combatants (and military targets) and
noncombatants (and nonmilitary targets); and the obligations of parties to the
conflict and those of neutral third parties were strictly distinguished. But,
perhaps due to its counterintuitiveness, the most prominent of all dichotomies
has been the sharp distinction between the jus ad bellum, the law governing
resort to force, and the jus in bello, the law governing the conduct of
hostilities.
Over time most of these binary choices have evolved into continua, and
the sharp distinctions have softened into overlapping sets of norms.
Exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force have been recognized in
response to new types of challenges ranging from imminent attacks,'
protracted and low-level attacks by nonstate actors, and humanitarian
catastrophes.3 Some would say, in addition, that the development of weapons
of mass destruction capability could also at times legitimate a preemptive
strike. 4 The significance of the distinction between international and
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noninternational armed conflicts has also been muted by the recognition that
both humanitarian and human rights obligations are relevant to both types of
conflicts. Guerrilla tactics that exploited the law's distinctions between
combatants and noncombatants, and between military and nonmilitary targets,
required the transformation of these sharp distinctions into a set of points
along elaborate continua. Both pragmatic and normative reasons have led to
the recognition of erga omnes applicability of the obligation to ensure
compliance with the laws of war and have therefore obliged neutral states to
be vigilant and even to take action.
5
Curiously, however, the insulation of in bello legal assessment from ad
bellum considerations has resisted this trend almost entirely.6 This dichotomy
is still in vogue among most international lawyers and philosophers.7 Michael
Walzer famously referred to these two sets of norms as "logically
independent," 8 and even those who question the morality of this distinction
understand its institutional significance. Yet there appear to be good reasons
to question this distinction. In this brief Essay, I undertake to question the
logic of the dichotomy by examining the growing influence of ad bellum
considerations in assessing compliance with in bello obligations in the context
of asymmetric warfare against nonstate actors.
B. The Challenge ofAsymmetric Conflicts
This exercise suits a publication that celebrates the jurisprudence of
Professor W. Michael Reisman. His close attention to changes in the
underlying political, economic, and social factors inspired the recasting of
many of these binary dichotomies as continua. Reisman also devoted much
attention, as early as the 1980s, to the challenges that asymmetric conflicts
pose to the regulation of warfare 9 due to the demise of the "dynamic of
reciprocity and retaliation"10 when nonstate actors are "neither beneficiaries of
nor hostages to the territorial system."'
Perhaps as a response to the decline of that dyadic dynamic of
reciprocity and retaliation, a new, broader dynamic has emerged, one that
involves a host of other actors.' 2 These actors-governments, international
5. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 199 (July 9).
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organizations, humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, and civil
society-have been translating their growing sensitivity to crises and human
suffering to the promotion of new types of monitoring and retaliatory
mechanisms ranging from divestment to criminal prosecutions of those whom
they find to have violated the law.
These various new actors and observers, and the institutions they have
developed, address a new type of battlefield that challenges the distinctions
upon which the law of war is founded. The tactics of nonstate actors exploit,
and hence undermine, two basic assumptions that have sustained the jus in
bello since its inception: first, that it is possible to compartmentalize the
battlefield and single out with sufficient clarity military from civilian targets
and; second, that there are obvious military goals, such as gaining control over
territory, that can reliably tell us whether the collateral civilian damage was or
was not excessive relative to the effort made to achieve those goals. The
combination of these two assumptions gave rise to the possibility that
humanitarian conflict, one in which armies would strive to induce each other
into submission without recourse to "total war," was achievable. War was
about inducing concessions from the defeated party by degrading its military
capabilities and weakening and disabling its fighters, without necessarily
killing them.
1 3
Unfortunately, neither assumption typically holds in warfare against
nonstate actors. First, there are very few purely military targets. This
dramatically limits the ability of a regular army to identify arenas where it can
legitimately project its power. In fact, as the 2003 invasion of Iraq showed, the
relatively weaker army will try to reduce these arenas by reverting to guerrilla
tactics. Moreover, it is no longer clear what can be considered military gain,
especially since control over enemy resources and territory often proves to be
a liability rather than an asset. Without tangible military goals, commanders
are tempted to simply capture or kill as many of their opponents as possible,
or to intimidate their opponents' noncombatant constituency.
Nonstate actors therefore pose a challenge that is fundamental to the
vitality and content of the jus in bello. Which military objectives could be
considered legitimate in an asymmetric warfare against nonstate actors? How
should one gauge the legitimacy of collateral civilian damage? In what
follows I suggest that bridging the divide between jus in bello and jus ad
bellum, and expanding the jus in bello proportionality test to include aspects
of the ad bellum conditions, offers a possible response to these challenges. Jus
in bello proportionality analysis can take into account not only the ad bellum
question of who is to blame for the commencement of hostilities, but also
incorporate the decision of one of the parties to pursue unrelated goals or to
prolong the military confrontation instead of negotiating its end, thereby
offering a more comprehensive assessment of the legality of the military
13. As the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration of the International Military Commission posited:
"[t]he only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy . . . . [F]or this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible
number of men." Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight [St. Petersburg Declaration], Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1868, 18 MARTENs NOUVEAU RECUEIL
(ser. 1) 474, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/1 30.
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action. Whereas according to the traditional jus in bello standard each enemy
is entitled to pursue its adversary until its total defeat, it increasingly becomes
relevant to inquire-at least in political discourse, if not in positive law-to
what extent continuing the fight is necessary. 14 For example, would it have
been legitimate, during the 1991 campaign, for the coalition forces not only to
drive the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, but also to invade Iraq and replace the
Iraqi regime? Under this framework, the party who had either no legitimate
reason to resort to force, or no good reason to pursue it further, would be more
limited in its ability to justify the infliction of harm on noncombatants when
pursuing its military objectives. If these propositions become part of the law,
they would effect a major change: the traditional in bello proportionality
analysis never required the attacker to explain the necessity of attaining the
military objective; the necessity of such action was taken for granted.
II. INTRODUCING JUS AD BELLUM CONSIDERATIONS INTO Jus IN BELLO
ANALYSIS
A. Observing State Practice
The reasons for maintaining the "total separation" betweenjus ad bellum
andjus in bello, which are generally valid, are both moral and pragmatic. Yet
they become strained in the context of warfare against nonstate actors. As a
result, it is possible to observe a shift in the attitude of different actors, who
inject ad bellum considerations into their assessment of the legality of certain
military measures. In this Part, I first articulate the observation concerning the
changing practice and then discuss its normative basis.
Even the adherents of the separation between ad bellum and in bello
admit that "conflicts continue to be viewed in terms of 'good' and 'evil' ...
[and that] the reality is that such differences, real or perceived, matter."1 5 For
example, during the Gulf War of 1991 both the coalition forces and the
international community took into consideration the illegality of the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait when assessing the proportionality of the military tactics
adopted by the coalition forces. As Gardam noted, "[i]n the assessment of
proportionality, civilians, and to a lesser extent combatants, of the aggressor
state were accorded less weight in the balancing process than combatants of
the 'just side."'"16 Reactions during the military conflict in Lebanon in the
summer of 2006 conflated ad bellum with in bello obligations.' 7 Similarly, in
reaction to the Israeli attack in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January
14. While some believe that thejus ad bellum assessment is applicable throughout the military
conflict, see, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between lus ad Bellum and lus in Bello, 9
REv. INT'L STUD. 221 (1983), others maintain that the ad bellum proportionality requirement becomes
irrelevant once war is raging, see, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 237-
42 (4th ed. 2005). But even Greenwood maintains that the ad bellum and the in bello norms that apply
simultaneously should remain insulated from each other.
15. Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, 62 A.F.
L. REv. 1, 41 (2008).
16. Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
391, 412 (1993).
17. E.g., Enzo Cannizzaro, Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in
the Lebanese War, 88 INT'L REv. RED CROSs 779 (2006).
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2009, key observers linked ad bellum and in bello considerations. When asked
whether Israel's attacks were disproportionate, the U.S. ambassador to the
United Nations responded: "Israel has the right to defend itself against these
rocket attacks and we understand also that Israel needs to do all that it can to
make sure that the impact of its exercise of right of self defense against
rockets is as minimal and no affect [sic] on the civilian population."',
8
B. The Implications of the Shifting Praxis: Reisman's Incident
Analysis Approach
To what extent do such reactions matter in law? In this inquiry, I follow
Reisman's theory of the incident as a decisional unit in international law,
19
which takes seriously the task of observing the responses of various actors to
assertions of rights and obligations under international law. By observing
reactions to incidents, it is possible to "mak[e] inferences about the normative
expectations of those who are politically effective in the world community."
20
A responsible legal adviser must conclude from such reactions that the
perceived justness of one's cause influences third parties' assessment of the
proportionality-and hence the legality-of one's military actions. Such an
observation is bound to shape the evolution of international practice and hence
also the law.
C. Evaluation
Thus far I have articulated the proposition that ad bellum considerations
do matter in in bello proportionality analysis, at least in political parlance. The
"incident theory" suggests that further support for the proposition is likely to
entrench it as the prevailing law. The task is now to reflect on this trend and to
ask to what extent the proposition reflects sound policy considerations. Most
contemporary scholars oppose the proposition based on two main arguments.
First is the argument from dyadic reciprocity. To ensure compliance withjus
in bello, both sides should enjoy its equal protection. The aggressor will have
no incentive to comply with the law if the defender is relieved from the law's
constraints. And because each side tends to view itself as just, unless jus in
bello is insulated from ad bellum considerations, the two camps will
immediately descend to ruthless brutality. 21 The argument from reciprocity is
convincing, and is even morally compelling, 22 when conditions for reciprocity
obtain. But warfare between a regular army and nonstate actors is not subject
to the dyadic reciprocity rationale. The asymmetric relationship in fact
incentivizes both sides to eschew reciprocal considerations: the nonstate actor
18. Press Release, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Statement by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad,
U.S. Permanent Representative, on the Situation in Gaza (Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://www.
usun-ny.us/pressjreleases/20081231_381.html.
19. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD
POLITICS (1988); W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the
Study ofInternational Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Reisman, International Incidents].
20. Reisman, International Incidents, supra note 19, at 2.
21. See Yoram Dinstein, Comments on War, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 877, 889 (2004).
22. Yitzhak Benbaji, The War Convention and the Moral Division of Labour, 59 PHIL. Q.
(forthcoming 2009) (on file with author).
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resorts to terrorism, whereas the stronger regular army is tempted to inflict
excessive harm upon noncombatants, to conflate military objectives with
killing combatants, and to treat captured combatants as outlaws.
However, as mentioned above, the growing involvement in such
conflicts of third parties, with their diverse modalities for reviewing the
belligerents' actions, shifts the incentive structure from the traditional dyadic
dynamic of reciprocity between the parties to a much broader dynamic.2 The
dueling parties must take the attitude of those third parties into account as the
combat is played out not only bilaterally but also concurrently in the global
arena. Toleration or condemnation by key international actors, including
public and private actors and observers, as well as by foreign and international
courts, often proves to be an effective constraint at least on the state party to
the conflict. The state party will not descend into barbarism regardless of what
the enemy does if it has an incentive to maintain its good reputation globally
or to avoid criminal sanctions. Since third-party observers assess both ad
bellum and in bello considerations, the percolation of ad bellum
considerations into thejus in bello proportionality analysis can prove a rather
sophisticated and effective constraint on the stronger regular army. The
introduction of ad bellum considerations into the analysis of jus in bello's
vaguer concepts-which often call for balancing of competing considerations,
such as the determination of excessive harm to civilians or the targeting of
individuals "for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities" 2 -would
not provide either side with more freedom of action or impose greater risks to
noncombatants. Quite to the contrary, a state party must convince the
international community that its military operations are aimed at just causes to
be able to justify the military goals it pursues. This fuller account of thejus in
bello proportionality analysis 25 examines not only the necessity of the
collateral harm to noncombatants but also the legitimacy of the pursuit of the
military goals. What the traditional law takes for granted-that in bello all
military goals are equally and always legitimate-can now be questioned by
the emerging new assessors and indirect enforcers of the law.
This is not to suggest that whatever the aggressor does would be tainted
as a jus in bello violation, nor that its population would thereby become fair
game. The basic rules of thejus in bello need not change; the prohibitions on
intentionally killing noncombatants, on denying quarter, etc., must remain
insulated from ad bellum considerations. Once thrown into combat,
combatants belonging to the aggressor would still be entitled to protect
themselves and their population from attacks by their enemies, and their
defensive military goals would be regarded as legitimate. Moreover, the party
that initially defended itself against aggression may subsequently overreact or
23. See Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443,
482 (2007).
24. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51(3), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3.
25. On the difference between "thin" and "thick" meanings ofjus in bellum proportionality,
see Georg Nolte, Thin or Thick? The Principle of Proportionality and International Humanitarian Law
(Jan. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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decline opportunities to settle the conflict, at which stage its margin of
discretion will be reduced.
Besides the argument from reciprocity, the other possible argument
against this suggested linkage between in bello and ad bellum is a moral one.
This argument sets out from the assumption that the insulation ofjus in bello
from ad bellum considerations is moral because of the equal protectionjus in
bello accords to combatants and noncombatants regardless of their affiliation.
Walzer calls it "[t]he moral equality of soldiers," who "have an equal right to
kill."' 26 Unequal application of the law is problematic because it divests
combatants and noncombatants of protection despite their lack of
responsibility for their leaders' aggression.
27
There are two moral objections to this argument forjus in bello equality,
which also support the injection of ad bellum considerations. The first
objection is that we should not accord morally equal weight to the pursuit of
unjust aggression.2 8 Yet even those who raise this objection nevertheless
accept that the laws of war-as distinguished from the morality of the war-
must treat both goals as equal, because of the dyadic reciprocity between
armies and their respective beliefs in the justness of their causes. 29 However,
as argued above, this moral concession to practical constraints is not
imperative under conditions of asymmetric warfare, where dyadic reciprocity
is nonexistent and alternative mechanisms to assess justness exist. The
availability of third-party institutions that enforce compliance with the law,
and identify where justice lies, relieves the moral assessment from the
shackles of pragmatic reasoning.
The second moral objection to the argument in support of the insulation
of jus in bello from ad bellum considerations challenges the depiction of the
jus in bello as evenly balanced. The focus on the law's impartiality between
the different combatants is misleading when one takes into account the
communities that fight each other. The laws of war are inherently biased in
favor of the stronger armies that can translate their relative economic power
into military gains. The weaker party that fights for a just cause must
nevertheless play by the rules that portend its defeat. The burden of obeying
the law-and indeed the burden of the insulation of jus in bello from ad
bellum considerations-therefore rests on the shoulders of the weaker side.
Small wonder that the constituency of the weak finds the insulatedjus in bello
morally corrupt. Weaker communities might be more inclined to subscribe to
a law that also takes into account the justness of the cause.
III. CONCLUSION OF AN OVERTURE
This short Essay can only outline the need to rethink the dichotomy
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and hint at the potential for more
26. WALZER, supra note 8, at 34, 41.
27. But see Benbaji, supra note 22 (manuscript at 2, 14-17) (offering an alternative
explanation).
28. Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 708-09 (2004); see also
Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality of War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 34, 44 (2005).
29. Hurka, supra note 28, at 45; McMahan, supra note 28, at 729-30.
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nuanced law. Obviously, one can anticipate several refinements that may lie
on the horizon, for example, in the context of individual criminal
responsibility or the authority of an occupying power. One major concern is
the precariousness of a system that relies on third parties, whose impartiality
and skillfulness in assessing the actions and motivations of parties to a conflict
may be called into question. Yet this is the very same system that we use to
assess ad bellum lawfulness. Far from perfect, it is the best available system to
measure compliance in asymmetric warfare against nonstate actors, and this
system already shapes the behavior and expectations of the various nonlegal
actors, including the parties to the conflict themselves. It is time for lawyers to
digest and expound the meaning of this new practice.
Michael Reisman was able to anticipate the evolution of the law by
constantly questioning time-honored postulates in light of "the common
interests of the aggregate of actors." 30 In his view, it is "the responsibility of
the international lawyer . . . to assess innovative claims carefully for their
contribution, in present and projected contexts, to the essential goals of law. ' 31
This short Essay seeks to apply Reisman's insights and methodology to the
study of the impact of ad bellum considerations on in bello proportionality. In
an era when armed conflict was the business of professional armies detached
from population centers and governed by reciprocity, dichotomies made
eminent sense. They enabled enemies to communicate their mutual
expectations. Binary messages--"yes" or "no" to the disproportionate killing
of noncombatants-were feasible and effective. But most contemporary
conflicts are different. Under such conditions, the insulation of jus in bello
proportionality analysis from ad bellum considerations may prove at times to
be more of a detriment than a contribution to the essential goals of the law. It
is therefore the responsibility of the international lawyer to reassess what is
perhaps the last remaining dichotomy in the laws of war.
30. Reisman, supra note 10, at 89.
31. Id.
